Abstract. We consider stable three-dimensional matchings of three categories of agents, such as women, men and dogs. This was suggested long ago by Knuth (1976) , but very little seems to have been published on this problem. Based on computer experiments, we present a couple of conjectures as well as a few counterexamples to other natural but discarded conjectures. In particular, a circular 3D matching is one where women only care about the man, men only care about the dog, and dogs only care about the woman they are matched with. We conjecture that a stable outcome always exists for any circular 3D matching market, and we prove it for markets with at most four agents of each category.
Introduction
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem in matching theory: Given a set of men and a set of women, find a matching that is stable. A matching is stable if there is no blocking pair, that is, a man and a woman who would prefer each other to their current partners in the matching. Gale and Shapley (1962) introduced this problem and proved that a stable matching must exist by describing an algorithm that produces such a matching.
The theory of stable matchings has become an important subfield within game theory, as documented by the book of Roth and Sotomayor (1990) . Game theorists are interested in the applications of matching theory in real markets. However, the theory of stable matchings also appeal to combinatorialists and computer scientists. Indeed, the first book on the subject was written by combinatorial computer scientist extraordinaire Donald E. Knuth (Knuth, 1976) . These books discuss not only the two-sided matching problem, but also the one-sided so called roommate problem where any two agents can form a pair. For the roommate problem, it is easy to find counter-examples to stability. Knuth (1976) lists a dozen suggested further directions for research on stable matchings, one of which is to investigate three-dimensional stable matching, say of women, men and dogs. A 3D matching is a partition of the agents into triples consisting of one agent of each type. A 3D matching is stable if no blocking triple exists, that is, a triple (a, b, c) which each of its members would prefer to their current triples in the matching. Of course, this calls for a definition of how agents rank triples based on their preferences on other individuals. Many possibilities exist.
The only paper we have found on three-dimensional stable matching problems is a complexity investigation by Ng and Hirschberg (1991) . They showed that some instances of what they dub the three-gender stable marriage problem (3GSM) do not have any strongly stable outcomes, and proved that the decision problem is NP-complete. (Strong stability is defined in the next section.) As an open problem, Ng and Hirschberg mention the circular 3GSM where, say, women rank triples based only on the man in the triple, and similarly men care only about dogs, and dogs care only about women. The origin of this problem is attributed to Knuth. In this paper, we will report the results of our investigation of the existence of stable outcomes of 3GSM in the circular version as well as in a few other versions. Our main conjecture is that circular 3GSM always allows a stable outcome. We prove this for all instances with at most four agents of each gender, and we describe the evidence from computer experimentation that led us to this conjecture.
Problem definition
Let N be the maximal number of agents of each of the three genders. Thus, N = 3 means that we have at most nine agents (three women, three men, three dogs). Without loss of generality we can assume that we have the maximal number of agents of each gender, for otherwise we can just fill the ranks with dummy agents who everybody likes less than any real agent.
We will assume that every agent ranks all possible triples based on her ranking of the individuals of the other genders. For example, every woman will have a preference list of length 2N on the set of all men and dogs. If a prefers b 1 to c 1 to b 2 , we write this as b 1 > a c 1 > a b 2 . Agents together with their preferences constitute a 3G matching market.
We will see several different rules for generating preferences on triples from preferences on individuals. If a prefers triple T 1 to T 2 we write
If preferences are not strict, we use ≥ a instead (weak preference).
A 3G matching is a partition of the agents into N triples consisting of a woman, a man and a dog. Given agents' preferences on triples, a 3G matching has a blocking triple T if all members of T strictly prefer T to their current triples in the matching. A 3G matching is stable if it has no blocking triples. A triple T is weakly blocking if some member strictly prefers T to her current matching and the other members weakly prefer T . A 3G matching is strongly stable if it has no weakly blocking pair.
The problem is: Given a triple preference rule, does a stable 3G matching exist for every matching market of size N? We have been interested in the following rules for preferences on triples. Let T = (a, b, c) and
• Circular : T > a T ′ if and only if b > a b ′ . Similarly, men care only about dogs, and dogs care only about women.
. In general, agents rank triples according to the weakest link of the triple, that is, according to their least preferred partner.
. In general, agents rank triples according according to their most preferred partner.
Note that the circular rule is a special case both of the weakest link rule and the strongest link rule, depending on whether we let the gender cared about in the circular rule be consistently low-ranked or highranked in relation to the other gender.
Investigating stability by computer
For size N, the number of different matching markets is (2N)! 3N , since each agent ranks all 2N agents of other genders. Even if isomorphic copies were deleted, the number of markets is large already for N = 3 and daunting for N > 3.
In order to investigate stability, we wrote a program (in Python) which starts by generating a random market of a given size N ≤ 5. For this market each of the N! 2 possible matchings are checked for stability (according to a given triple preference rule). The number of stable matchings is recorded. Then a local search for markets with fewer stable matchings is carried out as follows: Each of the 3N agents, in turn, changes its preference list to every possible alternative permutation. For each of these markets the number of stable matchings is computed, and whenever a new minimum is found, search proceeds from this market.
If a market with zero stable matchings is found, we have a counterexample to the existence of stable matchings for the given preferences rule.
If no market with zero stable matchings is found, we have an indication that there is none. More specifically we obtain an indication of the minimum number of stable matchings.
We started searching with N = 3, in which case we never found any markets without stable matchings for any of the three preference rules. This came as a surprise to us, and so we continued with N = 4.
Counter-examples to stability
With N = 4, our computer search found a counter-example to stability under the weakest link rule. In order to present the preferences in a convenient way, we write lists of ranking numbers from 1 to 8. Lower rank means more preferred. In fact, since the lowest number of stable matchings found by the computer is two for both cases N = 4 and N = 5 (examples of such markets available from the authors), we propose the following stronger conjecture.
Conjecture 2.
Under the strongest link rule, every 3G matching market has at least two stable matchings.
For the circular rule, which is a special case of the strongest link rule, the computer always find many stable matchings so we guess that the minimal number of stable matchings increase with N. We do not have enough evidence to produce a firmer guess, so our main conjecture is simply:
Conjecture 3. Under the circular rule, every 3G matching market has a stable matching.
The circular case conjecture would seem to be amenable to an algorithmic approach similar to the deferred acceptance procedure of Gale and Shapley (1962) for two-sided marriages. In other words, it is not difficult to come up with ideas of algorithms like the following:
"Let all women propose to the men they prefer most. Let every man tentatively accept the woman who is most preferred by the dog the man prefers most. Continue until all women propose to different men."
However, all such ideas seem to run into problems and we have resigned ourselves to nonconstructive approaches: In the next section we will describe how one might try to apply Scarf's theorem (Scarf, 1971) on balanced games, and why this fails. Finally we will carry out a case-by-case analysis, which is doable for N ≤ 4 but then seems to get out of hand.
Circular 3GSM is not a balanced game
If you want to show that a game has a nonempty core (which in our case is equivalent to the existence of a stable matching), one approach is to show that it is balanced in the sense of Scarf [6] .
Theorem 4 (Scarf, 1967) . A balanced n-person game always has a nonempty core.
Quinzii [4] showed (in a more general setting) that the usual twodimensional matching game is balanced. However, in this section we will see that our three-dimensional matching game is not.
For the general definition of a balanced game we refer to [6] . Here, we will merely examine what it would mean for our game to be balanced. A utility vector is a list where every person has written down her utility goal, that is, how happy she hopes to become. A utility vector is realizable if there is a matching such that every person reach her utility goal. A utility vector is realizable for a triple if all people in the triple would reach their utility goal if the triple were formed. Definition 6. Our game is balanced if, for every balanced collection C of triples, a utility vector is realizable if it is realizable for every triple in C. Now, we present a counterexample of size 3 + 3 + 3. Let C be the collection of triples corresponding to the shaded triangles in figure 1 . This collection is balanced, since every person belongs to exactly two triples (let all δ T = 1/2). Choose the preferences so that the edges in the figure correspond to rank 1 or 2. For example, a 1 will rank b 1 and b 3 as number 1 and 2 (in any order) and b 2 as number 3. Now consider the utility vector where every person hopes to get at least her second-best choice. This is obviously realizable for every triple in C, so if the game were balanced, the utility vector would be realizable. Since every instance of "x ranks y as number 1 or 2" has a corresponding edge in the figure, a realization of the utility vector is equivalent to a disjoint family of triangles (not necessarily shaded) in the figure which covers all people. But there is no such family: To cover a 2 , either of the triangles a 2 b 1 c 1 and a 2 b 2 c 2 must belong to the family. But none of the three triangles containing a 1 is disjoint with a 2 b 1 c 1 , and none of the three triangles containing a 3 is disjoint with a 2 b 2 c 2 .
7. Proof of stability for circular 3GSM with N ≤ 4 7.1. Notation. Say that a person is i-content if she has got the person she ranks as number i. If x's favorite y's favorite z ranks x as number i, we say that xyz is a 11i-triple. The proposition "there is no 11i-triple for i < j" is called the 11j-condition.
We will often use a dot diagram to describe partial information of the preferences. Here is an example: A solid line means "rank 1", a dashed line means "rank 2" and an i-labeled line means "rank i". So from the diagram above we get the information that a 1 's second-best choice is b 2 , but her favorite is b 1 whose favorite is c 1 who ranks a 2 as number 3. To make the following pages more readable, we will omit the dot labels, always implicitly referring to the labeling above (in the 4-case, of course, there will be an additional row a 4 b 4 c 4 a 4 at the bottom).
The 3-case.
Theorem 7. In the 3-case there is always a stable matching. Furthermore, for any person x, there is a stable matching such that either x is 1-content, or x's favorite is 1-content and x is 2-content.
Proof. We can assume that x = a 1 whose favorite is b 1 whose favorite is c 1 .
Suppose there is a 111-triple abc. Then pick that triple to the matching. Since a, b and c all are 1-content we can choose the other two triples however we like -the resulting matching will be stable anyway. If b 1 = b he is 1-content and we choose the remaining two triples so that a 1 gets her first or second choice. If b 1 = b then a 1 = a and we let the first triple be a 1 b 1 C where C is b 1 's first or second choice, and the second triple be the three remaining people.
In the following we assume there is no 111-triple, that is, we assume the 112-condition. Say, without loss of generality, that c 1 's favorite is a 2 . By the 112-condition, a 2 's favorite is not b 1 , so we can assume that it is b 2 . Now, b 2 's favorite is not c 1 , so we can assume that it is c 2 . Theorem 8. In the 4-case there is always a stable matching.
The proof is a technical case study who will last for the rest of this section.
We have the following cases:
The 111-case: There is a 111-triple. The 112-case: There is no 111-triple, but there is a 112-triple. The 113-case: There is no 111-or 112-triple, but there is a 113-triple. The 114-case: There is no 111-, 112-or 113-triple. The 111-case is trivial: remove the 111-triple and find a stable 3-matching of the remainder; then the 111-triple together with the 3-matching is a stable 4-matching since the people in the 111-triple are 1-content.
The 114-case is also simple: If there is a person x who is the favorite of at least two people, then x's favorite must rank some of these people as number 1, 2 or 3, and we get a 111-, 112-, or 113-triple. Thus, in the 114-case we know that no two people have the same favorite. We just let all a i be 1-content and we get a stable matching. 7.3.1. The 112-case. We have the following situation. By the 112-condition, a 2 's favorite is not b 1 , so we can assume it is b 2 . Now b 2 's favorite is not c 1 , so we can assume it is c 2 . We remove the triple a 1 b 1 c 1 for a while. By theorem 7 there is a stable 3-matching of the remaining people such that either a 2 is 1-content, or b 2 is 1-content and a 2 is 2-content. This 3-matching forms a 4-matching together with the triple a 1 b 1 c 1 . We will show that this 4-matching is stable. Suppose there is a blocking triple. It has to contain someone among a 1 , b 1 and c 1 . Since a 1 and b 1 are 1-content they do not belong to the blocking triple, so c 1 does. The only person c 1 wants to switch to is a 2 , so a 2 belongs to the blocking triple. Then a 2 cannot have her favorite b 2 , so, by construction of the 3-matching, a 2 has her favorite among b 3 and b 4 , and b 2 has c 2 . So a 2 wants to switch only to b 2 or possibly b 1 , both of which are 1-content. 7.3.2. The 113-case. If some person x is the favorite of at least three people, then x's favorite must rank some of these people as number 1 or 2, and we get a 111-or a 112-triple. Therefore, we can split the 113-case into two subcases: y the 113-condition we know that c 1 ranks a 1 and a 2 as number 3 and 4, so a 3 and a 4 must be number 1 and 2. We see that b 4 's favorite is not c 1 , so we can assume it is c 4 . Using the 113-condition again, we obtain the following. What are the possible blocking triples? We observe that a 2 is the only a i which is not 1-content, so a blocking triple must contain a 2 . Since b 1 and b 3 are 1-content and a 2 already has got b 2 , it follows that b 4 belongs to the blocking triple. We also see that c 1 cannot belong to the blocking triple, since c 1 already has a 2 which it prefers to a 1 . Thus, the only possible blocking triple is a 2 b 4 c 3 . In that case, a 2 must prefer b 4 to b 2 . In the same manner (using the matching a 1 b 1 c 1 , a 2 b 2 c 2 , a 3 b 3 c 4 , a 4 b 4 c 3 instead) we deduce that a 2 prefers b 3 to b 2 . This means that a 2 's second-best choice is either b 3 or b 4 . For symmetry reasons we can assume it is b 3 . By the 113-condition we know that c 3 's favorite cannot be a 2 , a 3 or a 4 , so it must be a 1 .
